Some issues that I was thinking to discuss for the presentation:
1. What sorts of activities are drives involved in?
This would be a good way to start the presentation, as it would show how important and pervasive Nietzsche thinks the influence of drives is on us. For example, drives affect our (i) perception, they affect our (ii) emotions, they influence our (iii) values, they lead us to (iii) philosophize on their behalf, etc.
2. What is the structure of a drive?
This could be led in with the question, (i) how do we discriminate among drives? This could then bring up the aim/object distinction. Drives could be distinguished on the basis of their general aims, yet Nietzsche still tells us that, because they are unconscious, drives admit of a certain obscurity. Also, in discussing the structure of a drive, I want to mention (ii) how drives show up in our behavior and psychology. The effect of drives show up as symptoms in the person that can be studied and traced back to the underlying drives behind the symptoms. Like Freud uses interpretation to get down to the drives (manifest content, latent content, drive wish), Nietzsche also uses an interpretive method to reveal the psychology at work in the philosopher (metaphysical beliefs, values, drive hierarchy). These can each then be thought about in reverse to wonder how our psychology worked to produce that manifest content and those metaphysical beliefs (including religious beliefs).
3. How do drives relate to each other?
This looks at the (i) causal versus (ii) political models of drive interrelations. Here is where the strictly dispositional versus homuncular readings come to the fore. In discussing the homuncular reading, I wanted to address the sort of capacities conceiving drives as homunculi requires drives to have, how having such capacities may present some problems, and how the homuncular reading could be reenvisioned to avoid those problems (perhaps by saying not that drives must be minimally conscious to recognize authority, but that drives can be involved in a political structure by virtue of being part of a person with self-reflective capacities and a disposition that makes them care about values. A person’s self-reflection can then be understood as an instrument that can be appropriated by drives).
4. How do drives relate to the self?
Here I’d be curious to look at the different ways drives can constitute the self and the problem of not being able to account for akrasia faced by the strictly dispositional reading. If drives are dispositions, organizing according to brute causal force, then how is one to account for cases of either strength of will and weakness of will, as according to a dispositional reading a person’s will would merely be the strongest drive at some time (which goes against our intuitions of a person identifying with some desire that comes in conflict with a stronger desire in cases of akrasia). I want to mention how drives constitute the self in Clark’s account and how Katsafanas adds consciousness as a means for establishing agential unity.
I was thinking that those four questions could potentially guide the presentation. I plan to spend the most time on the third question as that works closest with the material in the debate between the strictly dispositional (Katsafanas/Richardson) and the homuncular (Clark/Dudrick) reading of drives.